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Abstract 
In the United Kingdom, General Practitioners are incentivised through a national Pay-for-
Performance scheme to adopt evidence-based quality improvement initiatives through a 
portfolio of Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) indicators. We describe the development 
of the methodologies used to assess the cost-effectiveness of these Pay-for-Performance 
indicators and explore the value the process has added to the development of new indicators. 
Prior to analysis of new indicators, an economic subgroup of the NICE Indicator Advisory 
Committee is formed to assess evidence developed by health economists on the cost-
effectiveness of potential indicators in terms of the health benefits gained, compared to the 
cost of the intervention combined with the cost of the incentive. The expert subgroup is 
convened to reach consensus on the amounts that could potentially be paid to general 
practices for new indicators. Indicators are also piloted in selected general practices and 
evidence gathered about their practical implementation. The current methods used to assess 
economic viability of new pilot indicators represent a pragmatic and effective way of providing 
information to inform decision-making and recommendations. Current policy to reduce QOF 
funding could shift activity from national to local schemes, with economic appraisal remaining 
central to inform the rationalization of limited resources. 
 
  
3 
Introduction 
The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is a financial incentive scheme for UK general 
practices to improve quality of care. These practices͛ performance is measured against a set of 
quality indicators. The scheme was introduced in 2004/05 and is a component of the revised 
General Medical Services contract between the UK Government and general practice. The 
funding is intended to reward quality of care, leading to benefits for patients and the National 
Health Service (NHS). Research has shown that financial incentive schemes have the potential 
to improve the quality of primary care, though longer-term effects are still unknown.
1-3
 In 
addition, there is some evidence to suggest that these incentives have the potential to 
improve delivery of clinical care in underserved populations.
4, 5
  
There are two main components to the QOF, known as domains, and each includes a set of 
indicators designed to measure performance. The two domains cover clinical and public health 
indicators. Points are awarded to practices on the basis of their levels of achievement against 
individual indicators. In 2015/16 there were 77 indicators for the two domains, through which 
practices could score up to 559 points. On average, a QOF point is worth £160.15 to a practice 
in England during 2015/16.
6
 Table 1 shows the two domains, their associated indicators and 
the maximum number of points available for the indicators.   
[TABLE 1] 
For each clinical area, the structure of indicator point allocation is generally similar. Initially, 
the production and maintenance of a register of patients are categorized as ͚‘ecords͛.   Other 
indicators are classified as ͚IŶitial diagŶosis͛ and ͚OŶgoiŶg ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛.   Certain clinical areas 
have a large number of points attached to specific indicators. These are usually clinical areas 
where there is a clear link between clinical activity and improved outcomes, such as blood 
pressure reduction
7
 and smoking cessation.
8, 9
 A few indicators have higher valuation, in some 
4 
cases these activities run across several indicator sets (Table 2).  For instance, smoking 
cessation is linked to ten unique disease areas. 
[TABLE 2] 
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) convenes the Indicator Advisory 
Committee, quarterly to:  
฀ Prioritize suggestions for new clinical or public health topics and make 
recommendations for indicator development; 
฀ Consider the outcome of piloting, consultation and economic appraisal of potential 
indicators, and make final recommendations on new indicators; 
฀ Review information on the uptake of current indicators in the QOF and recommend 
whether any should be retired, considered for changes to points and/or thresholds, 
or be subject to further assessment. 
Once the Committee has agreed new topic areas for indicator development, work is carried 
out to develop the indicators and to pilot them with up to 40 practices across the UK using a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methodology. For example, this may include 
gathering data on levels of achievement for piloted indicators and interviewing practice staff 
about issues around implementation of indicators.
10
 As part of this process evaluation, work is 
also undertaken to assess the cost-effectiveness of incentivising the adoption of appropriate 
pilot indicators. This is done to provide the Committee with evidence on the potential costs 
and cost benefits of pilot indicators alongside the evidence from piloting.  This is particularly 
important in the current economic climate, where the efficient use of general practice 
resources reinforces the need to adopt cost-effective decision-making. 
 
5 
Methods for assessing the cost-effectiveness of QOF indicators 
The methods applied to determine the cost-effectiveness of QOF indicators adopt a net 
(monetised) benefit approach. In summary, the method applies the following calculation to an 
indicator:  
Net benefit = (monetised health benefit – delivery cost) – QOF payment 
In order to undertake cost-effectiveness analysis for QOF indicators, estimates for a number of 
variables are required, including details listed in Table 3. 
[TABLE 3]  
To estimate the net benefit of an indicator, it is necessary to have information on the benefits 
and costs associated with the indicator. To gather these costs and benefits, a rapid review of 
the available economic evidence is carried out. The opinions of those involved in delivering the 
indicators at pilot GP sites are also sought. The costs associated with an indicator include care 
delivery costs; for example, the costs of additional GP or nurse consultations to monitor a 
patieŶt͛s health status over a period of time, the initial cost of implementing the intervention, 
and if relevant, secondary care service usage. The unit costs for these activities can be 
obtained from sources 
11, 12
 such as the Personal Social Services Research Unit (PSSRU) and the 
Payment by Results tariff (PbR). Indicator costs also include unexpected consequences such as 
an increase in referrals resulting from more intensive monitoring. This may lead to increased 
health service usage costs in the short-term, as in the case of chronic kidney disease (CKD), 
where the introduction of estimated glomerular filtration rate (eGFR) as a prognostic indicator 
led to a 61 per cent increase in new patient referrals in a NHS Trust.
13
  
The benefits refer to health benefits which might be gained by a patient as a result of 
introducing the indicator. The monetised health benefit of the indicator refers to the value of 
the health improvements associated with achieving the predicted benefits of the indicator.  
6 
For example, in the case of using ambulatory blood pressure monitoring (ABPM) to confirm a 
diagnosis of hypertension, these can include the avoidance of cardiovascular events in people 
correctly diagnosed as hypertensive. These benefits are presented in terms of the change in 
quality adjusted life years (QALYs) as a result of introducing a new indicator compared to 
standard practice without the new indicator. QALYs are a measurement of health status, using 
utility measures such as the EQ-5D survey.  These measures categorise a persoŶ͛s health status 
as usually ranging from a value of one for someone in perfect health to a value of zero 
representing death. 
14
 NICE recommends the use of QALYs as a measure of health benefit to 
enable a standardised approach for economic evaluations across health areas.
15
 In making 
recommendations on cost-effectiveness, NICE values QALYs between £20,000 and £30,000. 
For evaluating cost-effectiveness of new indicators, the lower QALY value of £20,000 is 
considered.  In addition to the health benefits for patients, the cost-effectiveness analysis also 
takes into account any cost savings that might be achieved, such as avoided adverse events or 
avoided hospital admissions. 
The QOF payments that are made on reaching particular levels of achievement for the 
indicator are also considered in the net benefit analysis. The QOF payment is assumed to be an 
incentive payment that is additional to the delivery cost. Payments are triggered once 
performance for an indicator exceeds the minimum threshold, i.e. the minimum proportion of 
the eligible population within a GP practice who receive the intervention associated with the 
indicator.  Payments increase linearly until performance reaches the maximum threshold, 
which is usually around 85% to 90% of the eligible population. For instance, blood pressure 
management in secondary prevention of coronary heart disease (CHD) is incentivized. The 
payments for this indicator are triggered once 53 per cent of CHD patients in a general practice 
have a blood pressure reading of 150/90 mmHg or less in the preceding 12 months. The level 
of payment increases linearly up to a maximum of 93 per cent of CHD patients with a 
measured blood pressure reading of 150/90 mmHg or less. 
16
 
7 
Having taken account of the costs and benefits, described above, the output of this process is 
an estimate of net benefit. This analysis is conducted based on the entire population of 
England which is assumed to comprise 7,962 practices with a mean practice size of 7,034 
patients.
17
 The findings are presented in the form of a net benefit table. The table shows 
different combinations of QOF points and levels of achievement (percentages of the eligible 
population to whom the indicator has been applied) at which the indicator can be considered 
to be cost-effective. This allows the Committee to consider the number of QOF points (and 
thus the associated incentive payments) that could be offered before the indicator would stop 
being cost-effective. Where the net benefit is positive, then the indicator is considered to be 
cost-effective (the benefits to the National Health Services (NHS) outweigh the costs). For 
instance, cost-effectiveness analysis for nine indicators for cardiovascular disease and diabetes 
(BP5, CHD9, CHD10, CHD11, CS1, DM15, DM21, LVD3, Stroke12) implemented in 2004/2005 
with direct therapeutic impact were found to have positive net benefits, with mean payments 
per treated patient, made to general practice, ranging from £0.63 to £40.61.
18
  In some cases 
there may be a lack of evidence to support the use of the indicator on economic grounds, but 
it may be warranted according to other criteria, for example if it is considered by patients, the 
public and general practices to be valuable. In order to test the robustness of the results, 
sensitivity analysis is conducted to indicate the extent to which costs would have to rise, or 
benefits and eligible population would have to fall before the indicator ceased to be cost-
effective for specific numbers of points. 
 
Procedure for cost-effectiveness analysis of new indicators: role of the economic subgroup 
The Indicator Advisory Committee establishes an economic subgroup to appraise the work of 
the health economists involved in carrying out the economic evaluation of the pilot indicators. 
The subgroup is made up of committee members with relevant expertise, including practice 
8 
managers, general practitioners, and patient representatives. This ensures the analysis reflects 
clinical practice and consumer preferences. Prior to analysis of any new pilot indicators, the 
indicators to take forward for economic evaluation are agreed with the economic subgroup. 
The subgroup scrutinises the rationale for evidence and costs to be used in net-benefit 
analysis. Evidence of benefits of new indicators is derived from NICE evidence-based guidelines 
or other robust sources of evidence if NICE guidelines are not available. 
19
 Once the indicators 
to evaluate are agreed the health economists performs the economic analysis and presents 
their findings back to the subgroup for consideration and approval. 
Considering the process in more detail, each clinical indicator attracts incentive payments 
through achievement of specified QOF points. The subgroup advises the health economists 
about the range of QOF points that should be considered for the economic analysis of each 
new indicator, for example, between five and 15 points. To determine the appropriate range 
of points, the QOF point allocation is appraised by the health economists for similar indicators 
which are already implemented. This helps to promote a reasonably consistent approach 
within the existing QOF menu.  For example, indicators which include confirmation of 
diagnosis consistently have relatively low levels of QOF points allocated; e.g. COPD002 (The 
percentage of patients with COPD, diagnosed on or after 1 April 2011, in whom the diagnosis 
has been confirmed by post bronchodilator spirometry between 3 months before and 12 
months after entering on to the register) has a maximum of five QOF points. 
New indicators that are amenable to cost-effectiveness analysis are those that: 
฀ Lead to a specific treatment or therapy, e.g. cardiac rehabilitation after myocardial 
infarction; 
฀ Have clinically significant outcomes or are a surrogate measure of a clinically 
significant outcomes, e.g. lower cholesterol levels in diabetes 
9 
฀ Are likely to have relevant and robust data available on costs and benefits, e.g. 
reducing blood pressure in older people with hypertension. 
Those indicators which are less likely to be considered for cost-effectiveness analysis are those 
that: 
฀ Are solely process measures, e.g. the creation of a register but with no other action 
implied; 
฀ Are unclear or inconsistent around the impact of the intervention, e.g. indicators that 
refer to ͚support and advice͛; 
฀ Are likely to have a lack of availability of high level evidence (e.g. no randomized 
controlled trials). 
These are not specific rules but provide a guide to the usual rationale adopted in deciding 
whether an indicator can be assessed for its cost-effectiveness. In some cases, the 
effectiveness of a clinical indicator may not be clear and in these circumstances economic 
evaluation can still be performed using an approach called ͞threshold analysis͟.  This helps to 
determine the point at which an indicator becomes cost-effective (i.e. the net benefit is 
positive). For example, if there is a lack of evidence around the benefits of a specific treatment 
that could be incentivised through clinical indicators, threshold analysis can be used to 
estimate how much clinical improvement has to be achieved before financial incentivisation is 
cost-effective at different levels of QOF points. In 2011, an indicator was piloted on the 
percentage of patients with asthma who in the previous 15 months had a record of structured 
asthma educational discussion.  There was insufficient evidence on the health benefits of the 
intervention, measured by QALYs, to allow net benefit analysis. Instead, the delivery costs, 
eligible population and levels of reported achieved were modelled against estimated cost 
savings generated through assumptions about reductions in hospital admissions and A&E visits 
10 
avoided with the intervention.  Scenarios were developed to indicate how many points might 
be justified before the indicator would cease to be cost-effective. 
Once economic evidence is collated for the relevant pilot indicators, the information is 
reported back to the economic sub-group for discussion and agreement. More recently, the 
economic sub-group has recommended further analysis to assess the extent to which the cost-
effectiveness of an indicator exceeds the upper range of agreed QOF points.  This allows an 
assessment of those indicators that are analysed as being very cost-effective, as opposed to 
simply reporting that the indicator is cost-effective to the upper limit of points originally 
agreed by the economic subgroup. As there are only a fixed number of QOF points to 
financially incentivise general practices, it is not feasible for these extra points to be 
recommended for adoption.  However, the upper limit of points does provide an indication of 
the extent to which the indicator is cost-effective.  
In 2012/13, there were 31 different new indicators proposed for piloting, of which 14 were 
considered viable for cost-effectiveness analysis. These latter indicators are outlined in Table 4 
and twelve were assessed as being cost-effective. Some of the proposed new indicators, 
particularly those relating to reducing blood pressure, were considered to be cost-effective 
well above the maximum QOF points agreed by the economic sub-group.   
[TABLE 4] 
 
Table 5 summarises reasons why other indicators were not viable to perform economic 
analysis. This is primarily related to a lack of evidence or the inability to link an indicator to 
measurable clinical outcomes.  
[TABLE 5] 
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Limitations to the cost-effectiveness assessment method 
The net benefit approach lends itself to evaluating the cost-effectiveness of indicators that 
have a clearly established direct therapeutic effect, ideally from robust trial evidence. That is, 
those indicators where achievement can be shown to clearly impact on health status or life 
expectancy, allowing the benefits to be expressed in terms of QALYs. Many of the ͚OŶgoiŶg 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛ indicators have these characteristics. This approach is less applicable to 
evaluating ͚IŶitial diagŶosis͛ indicators, although this does not mean that such indicators are 
not actually cost-effective.  In the absence of robust trial evidence, these indicators are 
normally evaluated for their cost-effectiveness by using clearly defined but very conservative 
modelling assumptions, i.e. using lower range estimates of benefits and higher range estimates 
for costs. Due to these conservative assumptions, ͚Initial diagŶosis͛ indicators may not appear 
as cost-effective as ͚OŶgoiŶg ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛ indicators.   
An example of such an indicator is the (now retired) chronic kidney disease indicator, CKD2 
(The percentage of patients on the CKD register whose notes have a record of blood pressure in 
the preceding 15 months), which was based on the assumption that monitoring can lead to 
differing levels of therapy resulting in improvement in renal function.  However, it could 
equally be argued that monitoring per se, provides little if any health benefit and the benefits 
associated with improved control only occur as a result of subsequent treatment. Critically, a 
clear link needs to be made between process measures and their clinically-relevant outcomes.  
It is important to note that NICE does not consider the broader societal perspective in 
considering costs. Hence, analyses are limited to a health services perspective which, for 
practical purposes, simplifies the economic evaluation. External costs such as the productivity 
loss or lost household production are not included in the analyses.  
Additionally, the current NICE recommendation for conducting cost-effectiveness analysis only 
assesses the incremental changes in quality of life for patients. Conditions which require long-
12 
term care, such as dementia, will impact the quality of life of both patients and their care-
givers and family members. The 2014/15 NICE indicators included two indicators to improve 
dementia care (NM64, NM65).
20
  However, cost-effectiveness analysis assessing these 
indicators did not involve outcomes associated with family members and care-givers. If these 
outcomes were to be included in the analysis, these dementia indicators may be extremely 
cost-effective as seen in studies which have assessed outcomes associated with care givers.
20
 
 
Discussion 
This approach to assess the economic viability of new pay-for-performance indicators 
represents a pragmatic and effective way of providing the NICE Indicator Advisory Committee 
with information to inform its decision making and recommendations for new national QOF 
indicators. The clear presentation of the economic net benefit taking account of both delivery 
and reimbursement costs, supported by close scrutiny of the clinical evidence and regular 
expert input, allows the Committee to understand whether the new indicator is likely to be 
cost-effective in general practice and, more importantly, the extent to which it is cost-effective 
through application of sensitivity analysis. 
Currently, the economic subgroup of the Committee is presented with cost-effectiveness data 
based on published trial evidence to determine the effectiveness of interventions to inform 
the development of new pay-for-performance indicators.  Based on evaluation of the impact 
of QOF over the past decade, there is a risk that this may be over-optimistic about the 
population health benefits 
21, 22
: at inception the general practitioŶers͛ pay-for-performance 
scheme was estimated to reduce mortality by 11 lives per 100,000 people over the first year of 
implementation, this was still below the 56 lives per 100,000 people that could have been 
saved if all eligible patients were treated.
 21
   This may be partly related to general practice 
already exceeding target performance for full payments (e.g. percentage of patients already 
treated) at introduction of the scheme.
 21
   The issue of realistic payment thresholds is partially 
13 
ameliorated by pilot testing of new indicators prior to implementation.  Further, whilst there 
has been modest observed improvement in quality of care in the short to medium-term in 
indicator areas, such as reduction in hospital admissions 
23
, decrease in short-term mortality 
24
, 
and modestly improved quality of care for chronic diseases 
25
,
 
the long-term impacts on costs, 
practitioner behaviour, and population health outcomes still need evaluating. Going forward, 
direct extraction of data on health benefits and baseline target performance from general 
practices, rather than basing these on trial evidence, would allow the economic subgroup to 
make more robust and realistic decisions about the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of 
specific indicators within the pay-for-performance scheme. 
Finally, the recommendations for new QOF pay-for-performance indicators are being 
developed in a climate of financial restraints. Across England in 2011 to 2013, practices 
achieved the upper payment thresholds for 87 per cent of all clinical indicators. 
26
 This level of 
achievement is greater than policy makers had anticipated. To reduce resource implications, 
the English Department of Health has increased payment thresholds and is reducing point 
allocation. 
27
 As a consequence, although economic analysis may show that an indicator may 
be cost-effective up to a very high number of QOF points, it is not feasible to recommend 
those points. However, there may be other opportunities to adopt these indicators: 
commissioners at local and regional level are already incentivising certain clinical activities, in 
some cases using QOF-like pay-for-performance schemes.
28
 Commissioners may also consider 
clinical areas, identified as highly cost-effective, appropriate to incentivise locally over and 
above the national QOF scheme. This may be particularly relevant for indicators that have 
been shown to be cost-effective up to much higher levels of QOF points than would be feasible 
to be awarded within the finite and reducing budget in the national QOF scheme.    
In conclusion, the reduced level of funding available through the national pay-for-performance 
quality improvement scheme means economic appraisal is more important than ever, to 
14 
ensure that the most cost-effective indicators are incentivised among those which are still 
retained in the scheme. 
  
15 
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Table 1: QOF domains, indicators and points for 2015/16 
 Number of 
indicators 
Points 
Clinical domain 
Atrial fibrillation 3 29 
Secondary prevention of coronary heart disease 4 35 
Heart failure 4 29 
Hypertension  2 26 
Peripheral arterial disease 3 6 
Stroke and Transient Ischemic Attack 5 15 
Diabetes mellitus 11 86 
Asthma 4 45 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 6 35 
Dementia 3 50 
Depression 1 10 
Mental health 7 26 
Cancer 2 11 
Chronic kidney disease 1 6 
Epilepsy 1 1 
Learning disability 1 4 
Osteoporosis: secondary prevention of fragility fractures 3 9 
Rheumatoid arthritis 2 6 
Palliative care 2 6 
Total 65 435 
Public health domain 
Cardiovascular disease – primary prevention 1 10 
Blood pressure 1 15 
Obesity 1 8 
Smoking 4 64 
Cervical screening 3 20 
Contraception 2 7 
Total 12 124 
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Table 2: Clinical and Public Health QOF indicators with high points allocations (2015/16) 
Indicator Points 
HYP006: The percentage of patients with hypertension in whom the last blood 
pressure reading (measured in the preceding 12 months) is 150/90 mmHg or less 
20 
AST003: The percentage of patients with asthma, on the register, who have had 
an asthma review in the preceding 12 months that includes an assessment of 
asthma control using the 3 RCP questions 
20 
DEM004. The percentage of patients diagnosed with dementia whose care plan 
has been reviewed in a face-to-face review in the preceding 12 months 
39 
SMOK002: The percentage of patients with any or any combination of the 
following conditions: CHD, PAD, stroke or TIA, hypertension, diabetes, COPD, 
CKD, asthma, schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder or other psychoses whose 
notes record smoking status in the preceding 12 months 
25 
SMOK005: The percentage of patients with any or any combination of the 
following conditions: CHD, PAD, stroke or TIA, hypertension, diabetes, COPD, 
CKD, asthma, schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder or other psychoses who 
are recorded as current smokers who have a record of an offer of support and 
treatment within the preceding 12 months 
25 
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Table 3: Variables required in cost-effectiveness analysis of QOF indicators 
Variables 
฀ The eligible population; ฀ The achievement rate if the indicator is not incentivised; ฀ The incremental cost of delivering the indicator;  ฀ The incremental benefits, in terms of health gains, resulting from introduction of the 
indicator;  ฀ The proposed QOF payment for incremental levels of achievement. 
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Table 4: Cost-effectiveness  of new proposed 2012-2013 pilot indicators  
Clinical area Indicator description Indicator to be 
assessed for cost-
effectiveness? 
Was the indicator 
cost-effective? 
COPD  The percentage of patients with 
COPD and Medical Research Council 
(MRC) Dyspnea Scale ш 3 at any time 
in the preceding 15 months, with a 
record of a referral to a pulmonary 
rehabilitation program (excluding 
patients on the palliative care 
register). 
Yes – the indicator 
refers to a specific 
course of action 
taken to address 
the disease. 
Not at a QALY 
value of £20,000, 
with a baseline 
value of 5 points. 
MI/Heart 
Failure  
The percentage of patients with heart 
failure (diagnosed after 1/4/2011) 
with a record of referral for an 
exercise based rehabilitation 
program.   
Yes – the indicator 
refers to a specific 
course of action 
taken to address 
the disease. 
Yes, to upper 
bound of 10 
points. 
MI/Heart 
Failure  
The percentage of patients with an 
MI within the last 15 months with a 
record of a referral to a cardiac 
rehabilitation program. 
Yes – the indicator 
refers to a specific 
course of action 
taken to address 
the disease. 
Yes, to upper 
bound of 10 
points. 
Diabetes: 
Erectile 
Dysfunction  
The percentage of male patients with 
diabetes who have a record of 
erectile dysfunction with a record of 
advice and assessment of 
contributory factors and treatment 
options in the preceding 15 months. 
Yes – the indicator 
refers to a course 
of action that may 
have been taken 
to address the 
condition. 
Yes, to upper 
bound of 10 
points. 
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Tightly linked 
measures 
The percentage of patients with Type 
2 diabetes aged 40 years and over 
with successful lipid management 
defined as either: 
a) last recorded cholesterol in the 
preceding 12 months ч 4.0mmol/l 
b) last recorded cholesterol in the 
preceding 12 months > 4.0mmol/l 
and commenced on a moderate dose 
generic statin within 90 days of 
cholesterol recording 
c) last recorded cholesterol in the 
preceding 12 months > 4.0mmol/l 
and generic statin dose increased 
within 90 days of cholesterol 
recording 
d) or, last recorded cholesterol in the 
preceding 12 months > 4.0mmol/l 
and cholesterol lowering therapy 
changed to a different drug within 90 
days of cholesterol recording. 
Yes – parts b), c) 
and d) of the 
indicator refers to 
therapy so cost 
effectiveness data 
is likely to be 
available. 
Yes, to upper 
bound of 30 
points. 
Hypertension  The percentage of patients under 80 
years old with hypertension in whom 
the last recorded blood pressure 
(measured in the preceding 9 
months) is 140/90 or less.   
Yes – the indicator 
refers to an 
intermediate 
outcome for 
which there is 
likely to be 
economic 
evidence around 
relevant 
interventions. 
Yes, to upper 
bound of 80 
points. 
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Hypertension  The percentage of patients aged 80 
years and over with hypertension in 
whom the last recorded blood 
pressure (measured in the preceding 
9 months) is 150/90 or less. 
Yes – the indicator 
refers to an 
intermediate 
outcome for 
which there is 
likely to be 
economic 
evidence around 
relevant 
interventions. 
Yes, to upper 
bound of 15 
points. 
Rheumatoid 
arthritis  
The percentage of patients with 
rheumatoid arthritis aged 30-84 
years who have had a cardiovascular 
risk assessment using a tool adjusted 
for RA in the preceding 15 months 
(with appropriate exclusions). 
NOTE: currently the only CVD risk 
assessment tool which adjusts for RA 
is QRISK2. 
Yes – the indicator 
refers to a risk 
assessment, upon 
which treatment 
and therefore 
improvement 
could potentially 
be based. 
Yes, to upper 
bound of 10 
points. 
Hypertension The percentage of patients with a 
new diagnosis of hypertension after 1 
April 2012 whose diagnosis was 
confirmed following ambulatory 
blood pressure monitoring (ABPM). 
Yes – the indicator 
indicates 
confirmation of a 
diagnosis that 
should lead to 
treatment or 
therapy. 
Yes but only 23 
points were 
justified at 
£20,000 per QALY.   
Dementia care The percentage of care givers (of a 
person with dementia) who have had 
an assessment of their health and 
support needs in the preceding 12 
months. 
Yes – the indicator 
refers to an 
assessment which 
may lead to 
support or 
treatment being 
provided. 
Yes, to upper 
bound of 15 
points. 
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CHD The percentage of patients under 80 
with coronary heart disease in whom 
the last blood pressure reading 
(measured in the preceding 15 
months) is 140/90 or less. 
Yes – the indicator 
refers to an 
intermediate 
outcome for 
which there is 
likely to be 
economic 
evidence around 
relevant 
interventions. 
Yes, to upper 
bound of 20 
points. 
Peripheral 
Arterial 
Disease 
The percentage of patients 80 and 
over with peripheral arterial disease 
in whom the last blood pressure 
reading (measured in the preceding 
15 months) is 150/90 or less. 
Yes – the indicator 
refers to an 
intermediate 
outcome for 
which there is 
likely to be 
economic 
evidence around 
relevant 
interventions. 
Not at a QALY 
value of £20,000, 
with a baseline of 
5 points. 
Peripheral 
Arterial 
Disease 
The percentage of patients under 80 
with a history of PAD whose last 
recorded blood pressure reading 
(measured in the preceding 15 
months) was 140/90. 
Yes – the indicator 
refers to an 
intermediate 
outcome for 
which there is 
likely to be 
economic 
evidence around 
relevant 
interventions. 
Yes, to upper 
bound of 10 
points. 
Stroke The percentage of patients under 80 
with a history of stroke or TIA in 
whom the last blood pressure 
reading (measured in the preceding 
15 months) is 140/90 or less. 
Yes – the indicator 
refers to an 
intermediate 
outcome for 
which there is 
likely to be 
economic 
evidence around 
relevant 
Yes, to upper 
bound of 15 
points. 
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interventions. 
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Table 5: Reasons cost effectiveness of new proposed 2012-2013 pilot indicators not viable 
Reason cost-effectiveness analysis 
not appropriate 
Example of Indicator 
Indicator relates to an assessment to inform 
treatment options rather than to intervention 
so unlikely to yield robust evidence around 
cost effectiveness. 
The percentage of patients with depression 
who have had a bio-psychological assessment 
by the point of diagnosis. 
Indicator relates to follow-up care and 
monitoring so unlikely to yield robust evidence 
around cost effectiveness. 
The percentage of patients with recurrent or 
distant metastatic cancer diagnosed within the 
preceding 18 months who have a review 
recorded as occurring within 3 months of the 
practice receiving confirmation of the 
diagnosis. 
Indicator only relates to diagnosis so unlikely 
to yield robust evidence around cost 
effectiveness. 
The percentage of patients, 5 years and over, 
newly diagnosed as having asthma from 1 April 
2011 in whom there is a record that the 
diagnosis of asthma has been made supported 
by the current BTS-SIGN guidelines. 
Indicator refers to support and advice. There is 
uncertainty about whether the advice would 
lead to improved clinical outcomes. 
The percentage of women with diabetes under 
the age of 55 years who have a record of 
information and counselling about 
contraception, conception and pregnancy in 
the preceding 15 months. 
 
 
